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SECURITY INITIATIVES THAT FOLLOW
WHAT MOLOTCH CALLS THE “COMMAND-
AND-CONTROL” MODEL FAIL BY TURNING
A BLIND EYE TO THE TASK OF “MAKING
LIFE BETTER ALL ALONG THE WAY.”
February 14, 2013 — Being “against security” would be absurd in a place like
Colombia, where my research is based. People from all over the country have
suffered through decades of armed conflict only to now face new threats to their
lives and livelihoods. Since the mid-1980s, the capital city of Bogotá has received
close to a million internal refugees fleeing violence.1 According to one estimate, an
average of 52 displaced families arrive every day.2 Over the past few years, this
problem has been compounded by the worst rains in recorded history. The resulting
floods and landslides have displaced hundreds of thousands more, destroyed homes
throughout the country, and taken several hundred lives. While the storms have
temporarily subsided and the government is engaging tentatively in peace talks with
the guerrillas, newly emergent criminal organizations and increasingly severe
weather patterns demand that security remains an everyday concern for many.
Opposing security doesn’t make much sense even in the global North. People
there have more resources to prepare themselves for future shocks, but they, too, are
far from immune, as demonstrated most recently by Superstorm Sandy and the
school shooting in Connecticut. Yet over the past decade, most social scientists have
taken just such a stance. Objecting to state abuses carried out in the name of
protection, they have criticized security campaigns in the United States since 9/11
for their deleterious effects: the erosion of civil liberties, the legitimation of torture,
the production of fear, the proliferation of private contractors, the excess of
surveillance, the normalization of xenophobia, and the unending wars against
abstract enemies. Moreover, they have shown how security campaigns often have the
inverse result of making us even less secure. Though well warranted, such critiques
have offered little in the way of alternatives. They seem surprisingly content to leave
the endangered to take responsibility for their own safety.
Harvey Molotch’s Against Security: How We
Go Wrong at Airports, Subways, and Other
Sites of Ambiguous Danger is no such book.
It both scrutinizes what has gone terribly
wrong in the United States since 2001 and
proposes an altogether different approach.
In a critical register, Molotch demonstrates
how security now penetrates people’s daily lives without making them demonstrably
safer. For example, his research on the New York subway, in collaboration with
Noah McClain, found not one case in which the “If You See Something, Say
Something” campaign prevented an attack on the transportation system or its
passengers. Likewise, airport security protocols have made air travel increasingly
distressing while reducing our capacity to protect ourselves from potential threats. In
general, security initiatives that follow what Molotch calls the “command-and-
control” model fail by turning a blind eye to the task of “making life better all along
the way.” As a result, they unjustly distribute suspicion and harassment according to
entrenched forms of privilege and discrimination while encouraging conformist
behavior and disabling critical thought. Although Molotch seems especially incensed
by the daily annoyances security mechanisms create, his most damning observation
is that, from counterterrorism to flood protection, the “official provisioning of
safety can indeed contradict safety as actual practice.” Yet Molotch’s position on
security is reflected less in his book’s title than in its constant refrain: “Something
must be done.”
RATHER THAN FETISHIZING THE INNATE
ABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS TO RESPOND TO
CRISIS, MOLOTCH PREFERS TO BUILD “ON
THE CAPACITY OF REAL HUMAN NATURE,
SOCIAL NATURE, TO RISE TO THE
OCCASION.”
In a variety of domains, Molotch offers practical recommendations. These
range from the comically simple—install equipment to facilitate shoe untying in
airport security lines—to the undeniably sound—abandon all official forms of racial
profiling. Many of his recommendations converge on the “daring alternative of just
making things better,” as he puts it. Improvements in ventilation, signage, and
cleanliness on subways, for example, not only provide passengers with a more
pleasant experience but also enable them to secure their own safety and survival.
The goal of facilitating spontaneous behavior that promotes security extends to
people like subway station agents whose job involves protecting the public;
authorities must respect their capability to deal with routine problems. Molotch
applies the same logic to the reconstruction of Ground Zero, where he advocates
“building in the assumption of common aid” by designing evacuation routes that
help people to help each other. Likewise, his analysis of the disaster wrought by
Hurricane Katrina highlights the bending and breaking of rules as essential to
effective social and institutional responses to crisis. Here Molotch is at his best,
combining keen historical awareness and astute sociopolitical critique to understand
not only what went wrong but also why New Orleans should lead the way for all
human settlements vulnerable to rising seas and intensifying storms.
Overall, Molotch’s strategies rely heavily on
his belief in “resilience.” Jeremy Walker and
Melinda Cooper have tracked the rise of
this concept from its origins in the field of
complex systems ecology to its current
status as “a pervasive idiom of global
governance.”3 They attribute its success to
an “intuitive ideological fit with a neoliberal
philosophy” that treats cycles of crisis and adaptation as natural features of the
economy and society. For example, the notion of resilience makes it possible to
oppose governmental protection and regulation by encouraging individuals to
integrate crisis response strategies into their everyday lives. Although Molotch
distances himself from the mainstream security analysts who have popularized this
idea, he acknowledges a shared premise: “under conditions of uncertainty, it makes
most sense to rely on strategies of resilience rather than trying to do an advance
load-up of protections against particular but uncertain forms of threat.” His
pessimism about predicting security threats or preventing them from materializing
meshes with a strong wariness of bureaucratic authority and government
institutions. But rather than fetishizing the innate ability of individuals to respond to
crisis, Molotch prefers to build “on the capacity of real human nature, social nature,
to rise to the occasion.” His innovation is to invest in infrastructures, both social and
physical, that support collective resilience.
To realize its potential in Colombia, this approach would have to transcend
the legacy of former president Álvaro Uribe, who promoted security as a “collective
effort of all members of society.”4 His regime was known for empowering vigilante
citizens to engage in popular forms of counterinsurgency and for enabling
paramilitary armies to wage war against the guerrillas, but also against peasants,
labor organizers, and human rights activists. These security initiatives are, of course,
anathema to Molotch’s mutualistic, benevolent ones. But it would be careless not to
recall this recent history when considering what collective, spontaneous, and
unofficial approaches to security can mean. Molotch’s view from New York City
limits his ability to anticipate and address such concerns. Nevertheless, his
commitment to exploring positive alternatives advances a global debate—one that
has only just begun—over the need to invent genuinely progressive arts of security.
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